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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060327-CA

v.
FRANKLIN BUTLER,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of offering
or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), a
first degree felony, enhanced for its commission in concert with
two or more others (R. 83-84) . This court has jurisdiction over
the appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j)(West 2004).

See R. 102; Utah R. App. P. 42(a).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction where
defendant, standing by the side of a road at midnight and using a
"head nod" gesture typical of drug traffickers, twice signaled to
undercover officers to pull over, approached their vehicle, and
responded to the officer's inquiry about cocaine availability by
asking, "How much you want? A hundred? They are big rocks."

1

A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant
committed the crime.,/

State v. Goddard, 871 P. 2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (West 2004), governing
prohibited controlled substances, provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
• • •

(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
a controlled or counterfeit substance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one enhanced count of unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(West
2004) (R. 1-4). A jury convicted him of committing the crime in
concert with two or more other people, but acquitted him of doing
so within 1000 feet of a shopping center (R. 48-50).

The trial

court sentenced defendant to 365 days in the Salt Lake County
jail, with credit for 138 days served (R. 83-84).

The court did

not order either probation or treatment (R. 107: 4-5). Defendant
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filed a timely appeal, and the Supreme Court transferred the case
to this Court (R. 90-91, 102).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Near midnight in mid-October of 2005, in the vicinity of the
Rio Grande homeless shelter, five Salt Lake Police Department
vice squad officers in an unmarked van were patrolling for
prostitution (R. 104: 17, 21-22, 34). One of the officers,
Detective Boelter, testified that as they drove down 500 South,
several people "waved [them] over," a tactic commonly used to
initiate an illegal drug sale (Id. at 25). He explained:
During my experience, when we have made
arrests down there, generally, what the
individuals will do, . . . they stand on the
street corners, on the sidewalks, or in the
center of the divide, and as cars will drive
by they start walking out to the street, they
will start whistling, they will start hooting
and hollering type of thing. As the cars
pull to the side of the road, the individuals
will approach the passenger's side or
driver's side and basically conduct the drug
sale at that time.
(Id. at 25-26).

Noticing drug-related activity, the officers

drove past the men on the street and pulled around the corner,
where they "came up with a plan" to "go back and try to make an
arrangement . . . [to] attempt to buy drugs" (Id. at 26).

1

On appeal, the evidence must be reviewed in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict, recognizing that it is within
the "exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and
determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Booker, 709
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
3

With Detective Boelter in the front passenger seat, the
officers drove down 500 South a second time (Id. at 27). Several
individuals tried to get their attention (Id. at 26-27, 34). The
van pulled over and stopped (Id. at 27, 34). Defendant and a man
named Smith approached the front passenger window simultaneously
(Id. at 27, 43, 34, 35).
Detective Boelter testified:
The first thing I asked is, What you got?
Mr. Smith was first to respond. . . At that
time, he stated, What you want? I asked, You
got rock? From my training and experience
rock is a very common street term used for
crack cocaine. At that time, [defendant]
stated, How much you want? A hundred? They
are big rocks.
Id. at 27-28.

Detective Boelter consulted with the other men in

the van and then suggested "60," meaning sixty dollars, at which
point Smith told him he'd "be right back" (Id.).2

As Smith

walked away, defendant stayed by the window and another man named
Jones, who had been standing about 10 feet behind defendant and
Smith, approached the van holding six rocks of crack cocaine (Id.

2

Detective Boelter explained:
The individual that approaches the car to
make the transaction . . . generally does not
hold the drugs on them at that time. They
have somebody else in the area that has it. .
. . The reason for that is if that individual
gets arrested at the car, then the individual
that actually has the larger quantity of
drugs is not arrested. . . So they don't lose
the whole stash of drugs. . .
Id. at 31.
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at 29-30).

After Jones handed the cocaine to Detective Boelter,

the officers exited the van and arrested defendant, Jones, Smith,
and one other individual (Id. at 30).
Three of the four other officers in the van also testified.
Detective Johnson, the driver, testified that when they first
drove down 500 South, defendant "did make head nod gestures to
us.

The first time around the block, however, we didn't stop"

(Id. at 57). On the second pass, he said, "[w]e found
[defendant] again, same situation, head nods.
see if we could find narcotics" (Id.).

We pulled over to

Defendant and another

man, probably Smith, appeared "at the [passenger] window
immediately" (Id. at 58). Johnson corroborated that one man
asked, "How about a hundred?" (Id.).
Detective Kirkwood, whose attention was focused behind the
van for security purposes, testified only that defendant
approached the van with another man (Id. at 72-73).

Detective

Holmes, sitting in the rear of the van with limited visibility,
corroborated how the situation played out generally, but could
not provide any details (Id. at 84-86).
Defendant testified that he lived at the homeless shelter on
500 South (Id. at 95, 97). Although he was a disabled veteran
and was unable to work, he would sometimes pick up day jobs (Id.
at 95, 97). He testified that people would look for workers by
driving around the shelter and pulling up to hire people and that
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"they will come at any time . . . [d]ay or night" (Id. at 98).
Of the van that stopped at midnight, defendant testified:
I thought they were looking for workers. It
looked like one of them work kind of
vehicles. I walked over there . . . [j]ust
to see what they was offering, what kind of
work it was. . . . I was just being
inquisitive. I just walked over there to
find out.
(Id. at 98). Defendant further testified that while he was
acquainted with both Smith and Jones, he didn't know either man
well (Id. at 99-100).

He denied being involved in any plan to

sell drugs and maintained that he did nothing but stand by the
van (Id. at 100-02).

He maintained that he did not ask the

officers if they wanted to buy rock, did not negotiate the price,
and did not know that Jones and Smith were selling drugs (Id. at
106) .
A jury convicted defendant as charged, with an enhancement
for committing the crime in concert with two or more others. At
sentencing, the court noted that "the recommendation [of AP&P] is
for jail as opposed to prison probably because of the involvement
[defendant] had and the quantity of narcotics involved, and I
would agree with the recommendation" (R. 107: 5). Accordingly,
although the jury convicted defendant of a first degree felony,
the court sentenced him only to jail for 365 days, with credit
for 138 days served.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's acts of twice signaling a vehicle to stop in an
area known to the officers for its drug transactions, his
subsequent approach to the van, and his response, "How much you
want? A hundred? They are big rocks," to the query, "You got
rock?" together suffice to sustain his conviction for offering or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR OFFERING
OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WHERE
DEFENDANT SIGNALED A VEHICLE TO
STOP IN AN AREA KNOWN FOR DRUG
TRAFFICKING, APPROACHED THE
VEHICLE, AND RESPONDED TO AN
INQUIRY FOR COCAINE BY ASKING, "HOW
MUCH YOU WANT? A HUNDRED? THEY ARE
BIG ROCKS"
Defendant argues that the marshaled evidence fails to
support his conviction because the state did not adduce evidence
that defendant "took active steps ^in furtherance' of or to
facilitate a distribution" or that he "engaged in conduct knowing
or intending that a distribution ^would, or would be likely to
occur.'" Br. of Pet. at 13-14 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT
App 159, 11 9-10, 3 P.3d 725, abrogated on other grounds by State
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 1 16, 20 P.3d 300).3
3

Defendant appears to be challenging only the
for offering or arranging to distribute a controlled
His appellate brief makes no specific mention of the
for committing the crime in concert with two or more
Consequently, that issue is not before the Court for
7

conviction
substance.
enhancement
others.
review.

An appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence following a criminal conviction is limited.
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).

State

A reviewing court

will reverse a criminal conviction on insufficiency grounds only
when the evidence is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the
crime.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983),

superseded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
1987).

However, M[w]here there is any evidence, including

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a
reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the
verdict."

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

The statute under which defendant was convicted provides
that "it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally . . . offer[] or arrange to distribute a controlled
• . . substance."

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (West

2004) . The caselaw interpreting this statute is clear.

All that

is necessary to establish the offense is a knowing or intentional
mental state along with an offer or arrangement to distribute
drugs.

State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 n.5 (Utah 1979).

Intent to commit the crime, usually not susceptible to
direct proof, can be inferred from defendant's actions or from
surrounding circumstances.
110, 988 P.2d 949.

State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,

Proof of an actual sale can be helpful in
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establishing knowledge or intent but is not a necessary element
of the crime.

State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 1 12, 3 P.3D 723

(citing cases in which, "[e]ven absent proof of a completed
distribution, . . . [other types of evidence] reveal the
defendant's intent by showing that the defendant took active
steps to facilitate the completion of an illicit transaction").
As to the act of offering or arranging to distribute a
controlled substance, "any witting or intentional lending of aid
in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is
proscribed by the act."

State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923;

accord State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 11 9-10; State v.
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App 1990); State v. Gray, 717
P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986).

Thus, if defendant serves as

"one link in a chain of events . . . which eventually led to the
sale of [an unlawful controlled substance]," he is culpable under
the statute.

State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185.

In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict and leaving all determinations of
witness credibility to the trier of fact, the evidence sufficed
to conclude that defendant knew what he was doing, intended his
actions, and took active steps to facilitate the completion of a
drug transaction.
Defendant stood outside at midnight on a street known for
its drug-trafficking and intentionally initiated communication
with passing vehicles by nodding his head (R. 104: 57). Given
9

the location, the trained officers who were driving by understood
the gesture as an invitation to stop and buy illegal drugs (Id.
at 25-26, 57, 84). When the officers drove down the street a
second time, defendant repeated the gesture, thus confirming his
intent to interact with them (Id. at 57). When the van pulled
over, defendant immediately approached the window along with
another individual, Smith (Id. at 27, 32, 35, 58). Defendant
thus plainly intended to communicate with the van occupants.
The nature of the communication was soon revealed.

The

officer asked, "What you got?" but made no mention of any illegal
substances (Id. at 27). Smith turned the question back on the
officer, asking, "What you want?"

The officer then introduced

the subject of illegal drugs by asking for "rock," the street
name for crack cocaine (Id. at 27). With the conversation now
clearly focused on illegal drugs, defendant helped moved the
transaction forward by asking, "How much you want? A hundred?
They are big rocks" (Id. at 28). He thus offered a selling price
for the drugs, with which he was sufficiently familiar to
describe them as "big rocks."
At this juncture, defendant became culpable for offering or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance.

By both his

actions and words, he knowingly and intentionally took an active
step in moving a drug sale forward.

He initiated the stop of the

vehicle, and he approached the vehicle.

Once the officer named

his drug of choice, defendant began the process of negotiating
10
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of the crime.
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the location, the trained officers who were driving by understood
the gesture as an invitation to stop and buy illegal drugs (Id.
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second time, defendant repeated the gesture, thus confirming his
intent to interact with them (Id. at 57). When the van pulled
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actions and words, he knowingly and intentionally took an active
step in moving a drug sale forward.

He initiated the stop of the

vehicle, and he approached the vehicle.

Once the officer named

his drug of choice, defendant began the process of negotiating
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the price by asking the officer if he wanted $100 worth of crack
cocaine, thus moving the sale one step closer to fruition.

By

these actions, defendant became "one link in a chain of events,"
which was leading inexorably to a sale of cocaine.

State v.

Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185. No more is necessary to sustain his
conviction for offering or arranging to distribute a controlled
substance.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of distributing a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or agreeing, consenting, offering, or
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
a first degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this OS

day of September, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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